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Qualitative Comparative Analysis as a Method for 
Innovation Research: Analysing Legal  
Innovations in OECD Countries  
Thomas Laux ∗ 
Abstract: »Qualitative Comparative Analysis als Methode für die Innovationsfor-
schung: Eine Analyse rechtlicher Neuerungen in OECD-Staaten«. The article pre-
sents Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a method for innovation re-
search. Based on set-theory, a key feature of QCA is the possibility to examine the 
necessary and the sufficient conditions for the institutionalisation of innovations. 
QCA aims to identify equifinal explanations for a social phenomenon, which 
consist of a combination of several conditions. This approach distinguishes QCA 
from qualitative and quantitative methods. Furthermore, QCA combines a com-
parative and a case-oriented approach, which is especially interesting for the 
analysis of innovations as context-sensitive and contingent phenomena. QCA as 
a research approach and method is outlined briefly, with special regard to the 
tasks of innovation research. Its application is presented in a study of the con-
ditions for equal pay regulations in OECD countries. The analysis shows that the 
relevant actors for the institutionalisation of equal pay regulations are either 
women’s movements or unions but that neither are solely sufficient for this le-
gal innovation. Instead QCA also captures the context conditions for their im-
pact on the enactment of equal pay regulations. 
Keywords: Innovation research, QCA, legal innovation, gender equality, world-
polity, women’s movement, equal pay, civil society. 
1.  Introduction1 
Innovations are ‘ubiquitous’ phenomena in modern societies and thus an object 
of research in the social sciences (Braun-Thürmann 2005, 12). Originally inno-
vation research focused on economy and science, but since then innovations 
have been detected and examined across all social spheres (cp. Schumpeter 
1952, 94f; Zapf 1989, 175ff). Thus innovation research aims to study the simi-
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larities and differences between innovation processes in different spheres in 
order to develop theories of innovation.  
To this end Hutter et al. (2015, in this HSR Special Issue) distinguish three 
complementary perspectives for the analysis of innovation processes: the concrete 
actions that diverge from established patterns of doing things and thereby consti-
tute the practical foundation of an innovation (‘pragmatics’), its labelling or recog-
nition as novel and useful (‘semantics’) and the institutional conditions, which 
foster or prevent the implementation of innovations (‘grammar’). Each perspective 
demands a different methodological approach for innovation research. This article 
presents Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a method for investigating 
the institutional conditions for the implementation of innovations.  
The institutionalisation is essential for an innovation because it marks the dif-
ference between an invention and an innovation (Krücken 2005, 65). This refers 
to the definition of an innovation, which is the basis for illustrating the benefits of 
QCA for innovation research: (1) Innovations are intended and emerge out of a 
combination of already existing components (Schumpeter 1952, 96). They are the 
outcome of the interplay between different actors in a specific context. (2) Inno-
vations promise novel and better possibilities for problem solving or to gain 
better results. In doing so, innovations differ from existing modes of problem 
solving, have far-reaching impact on further developments and are perceived as 
fundamental changes (Kern and Nam 2009, 639; Polsby 1984, 8; Rogers 1995, 
11). (3) Innovations can only be identified ex-post in case of their success, which 
consists of their institutionalisation.2 One task for innovation research is to ana-
lyse the relevant conditions for their success (John 2012, 82). 
To grasp the relevant conditions for an innovation, its qualitative differences 
and benefits are to be identified. Innovations normally solve a problem or a defi-
cit, which points to the cultural background of their success (Kern and Nam 2009, 
638f; Rogers 1995, 392). So the demand for an innovation may arise from eco-
nomic needs – like the expansion into new markets or the reorganization of pro-
duction processes – or social and cultural changes – like the emergence of social 
problems or new ‘cultural visions’ (Kern and Nam 2009, 638; cp. Schumpeter 
1952, 101). Altogether, innovation processes do not proceed automatically, but 
are contingent and context-sensitive (Braun-Thürmann 2005, 50). 
The analysis of the relevant actors and the enabling structural contexts for 
innovations has always been one of the continuous tasks for innovation re-
search, e.g. Gilfillan (1970 [1935]) analysed the societal influences on the 
invention of the steamboat in a case study and provided a sociological perspec-
tive on inventions. Nowadays there are numerous methods to analyse the insti-
tutionalisation of innovations, which may be roughly divided into qualitative or 
quantitative approaches. The most frequently used ones are ethnographic stud-
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ies (e.g. Knorr-Cetina 1983) and the systems of innovations research (e.g. 
Blättel-Mink 2009; OECD 2005). Although both approaches offer important 
insights into the institutionalisation of innovations, they also possess some 
weaknesses. On the one side ethnographic case studies examine the enactments 
of novelty and innovations in an explorative way. The insights are hardly gen-
eralizable, lack a comparative perspective and the studies rarely involve the 
institutional contexts (Siebenhüner 2007, 107; Werle 2005, 320).3 The systems 
of innovation research, on the other side, offers comparative analyses of the 
technological and institutional effects on the competitiveness of countries and 
their economic growth (Blättel-Mink and Ebner 2009, 11). Innovations are un-
derstood as continuous processes and are measured by looking at key figures, like 
the number of new patents (Blättel-Mink 2009, 177; OECD 2005). The systems 
of innovations research mainly concentrates on the endogenous explanation of 
innovations by referring to technological or economic developments. It fails to 
clarify the systemic interdependence of the different factors and cannot give 
further insights into the developing process of a specific innovation. No attention 
is paid to the distinctive characteristics of innovations, which are responsible for 
their success (Siebenhüner 2007, 109; Werle 2005, 313ff). 
The strengths of both approaches should be combined for a more thorough 
analysis of innovations (Siebenhüner 2007, 113). The assumption of this article 
is that QCA as a research approach and method offers significant insights for 
the study of the institutional conditions for innovations by combining a com-
parative and a case-oriented approach. This does not imply that QCA is better 
than qualitative or quantitative methods for innovation research. Instead QCA 
is an alternative to the existing methods and offers unique features, which may 
be also relevant for innovation research.4 Based on set-theory, QCA is a diver-
sity-oriented research method (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 8). It enables 
the conduction of mid-N studies, which are highly relevant for innovation 
research because innovations are avant-garde and need not occur as mass-
phenomena (Ragin 2000, 25). Furthermore QCA makes it possible to conduct 
case studies on the basis of a structured comparison. Thereby, the context sen-
sitivity of innovation processes is captured along with their overall enabling 
conditions. The aim is to identify mechanisms for innovations and to develop 
middle-range theories to explain the success of innovations.5  
The basic principles of QCA and their application for innovation research are 
outlined in chapter 2. It involves the short discussion of some tasks for innovation 
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post and thus focusses on the analysis of inventions or novelties and not of innovations. 
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quantitative and qualitative methods. Since then, QCA has been established as an autono-
mous research approach and method in the social sciences. 
5  Referring to Mayntz (2004, 241) mechanisms are defined as ‘sequences of causally linked 
events that occur repeatedly in reality if certain conditions are given.’ 
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research in order to illustrate QCA’s advantages and shortcomings for innovation 
research. QCA’s application in the study of innovations is then illustrated in 
chapter 3 which contains a brief presentation of an analysis of the institutionalisa-
tion of equal pay regulations in OECD countries as legal innovations. 
2.  QCA as a Method for Innovation Research  
The following part gives a brief overview of the principles and assumptions of 
QCA: The aim is to present QCA’s benefits for analysing the institutional 
conditions for innovations. Not all the relevant aspects will be discussed exten-
sively in this chapter.6 The focus is on the characteristic features of QCA and 
some principles of set-theory in order to illuminate their potential for innova-
tion research. In addition the analytical process of QCA is briefly outlined. This 
includes the explanation of fuzzy-sets and the functions of a truth table.  
As a research approach QCA is characterized by the attempt to strengthen 
“the dialogue between ideas and evidence” (Ragin 2000, 309) as well as to 
develop new theoretical insights. QCA enables the identification of middle-
range theories, which may enrich or modify existing assumptions about innova-
tion processes (Merton 1967; Ragin 1987, 170). 
QCA is diversity oriented and tries to identify different solutions (i.e. com-
binations of institutional settings and/or actors) for a particular outcome (i.e. 
the success of an innovation) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 8). Its diversity 
orientation corresponds with the assumption that innovation processes do not 
proceed uniformly but instead according to different contexts and actors. Three 
principles – “equifinality, conjunctural causation and asymmetry” (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012, 8) – define QCA’s specific approach to social research: 
Equifinality describes that “different, mutually non-exclusive” conditions for 
an outcome must be discovered to explain one outcome (Schneider and Wage-
mann 2012, 326). The aim is to discover different solutions for an outcome 
with respect to the differences between the cases. Conjunctural causation de-
scribes the fact that the conditions are necessary or sufficient “in combination 
with precisely specified other conditions” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 
324). By looking for combinations of conditions, it is possible to grasp their 
interrelation – the conjunctural and sequential causalities – and to examine 
their specific social and historical environment (cp. McAdam et al. 2008, 309). 
Asymmetry as the third principle “implies that a causal role attributed to a 
condition always refers to only one of the two qualitative states” (Schneider 
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was recently published. 
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and Wagemann 2012, 322). This means that the reversal of a solution does not 
automatically explain its opposite. 
The cases are understood holistically as configurations with multiple and dif-
ferent memberships in different sets (Ragin 1987, 16, 99). Such configurational 
thinking is more appropriate in qualitative research and pays attention to the 
context of social phenomena (Ragin 2008b, 109). Such an approach suits the 
analysis of innovations as contingent and context-sensitive (cp. Braun-Thürmann 
2005, 50).  
Sets represent empirical concepts, e.g. states with a strong equal pay regula-
tion or the existence of a strong women’s movement. The set-memberships indi-
cate, “whether a case belongs to a concept (i.e., a set) or not” (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 24).7 Each condition and the outcome are operationalized by 
using a clearly defined concept. Then the interrelations of the set-memberships of 
the cases are compared in order to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for an outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 79; Ragin 1987, 85-102).  
A condition or a combination of conditions is sufficient if the cases’ mem-
bership scores are equal or lower than their memberships in the outcome 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 333). So the set of the condition is a subset of 
the outcome set and there are several sufficient conditions for explaining an 
outcome.8 A necessary condition is identified if the cases’ membership scores 
in the condition are equal or bigger than their memberships in the outcome 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 330).9 The necessary condition is a superset 
to the outcome set.10  
The analytical process of QCA can be divided into three phases: The ‘pre-
QCA phase’ encompasses the selection of the cases and the conditions (Schnei-
der and Rohlfing 2013, 3). The choice of conditions is guided by theoretical 
assumptions as well as “empirical insights gained during the research process” 
                                                             
7  Thus the data need to have a binary structure. A score of 1 shows full membership of a case 
in a set, whereas a score of 0 shows its full non-membership (Ragin 1987, 86f). The set 
memberships express attributes of the cases and indicate ‘whether a case can be described 
by a concept or not’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 24). 
8  A sufficient condition is characterized by the INUS condition, which says that the condition 
is an ‘insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient 
for the result’ (Goertz 2003, 68; Mackie 1974, 62; Mahoney 2008, cited by Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 79). 
9  A necessary condition is characterized by the SUIN condition, which says that it is a ‘suffi-
cient, but necessary part of a factor that is insufficient, but necessary for the result’ (Ma-
honey et al. 2009, 126, cited by Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 79). A necessary condition 
is a superset to the set of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 330). 
10  Necessary conditions must be distinguished from trivial ones. Trivial conditions do occur in 
all or nearly all cases, independent of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 144f). 
As a result, they do not affect the outcome and must be excluded from the analysis. 
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(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 277).11 Subsequently the memberships of the 
cases in the sets of the conditions are assigned. This process is called calibra-
tion and there are two notions of assigning membership to a set: the first one is 
using crisp sets (cs), which solely differentiate between membership (1) and 
non-membership (0) in a set. Crisp sets eliminate the qualitative differences 
between the cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 24f). Hence, fuzzy sets (fs) 
were introduced to assign membership in a set and allow to capture different 
degrees “among qualitatively similar cases” and transform these differences 
into “partial memberships” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 326; Ragin 2000; 
Zadeh 1965).12 Fuzzy sets enable the operationalisation of vague concepts that 
are predominant in the social sciences (Ragin 2000, 3ff). This is especially 
important for defining innovations, because they are essentially characterized 
by a qualitative difference from existing artefacts (see the given definition of an 
innovation at the beginning of the article). 
The calibration is based on both theoretical knowledge and empirical evi-
dence about the cases, which ensures the consideration of qualitative differ-
ences between the cases (Ragin 2008a). Three threshold values or anchors must 
be defined to turn the raw data into set memberships: First, full membership (1) 
in a set as well as full non-membership (0) in a set have to be defined. The third 
threshold value marks “the point of maximum indifference” (0.5) (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012, 32). The definition of the 0.5 anchor is important be-
cause it differentiates between cases that are majoritarian members in a set and 
those that are not (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 58). The three anchors do 
not reflect a continuous scale, but mark qualitative differences (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 28ff). To ensure the reliability of the calibration, it is neces-
sary to reveal the threshold values, the raw data and the method of calibration 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 403, 413).13  
Three operations are possible to determine the set-relations between the cases 
and between the conditions with all three based on Boolean algebra (see table 1 
for the notations): The negation of a membership in a set indicates the complete 
non-membership of a case, which automatically indicates membership in the 
complementary set (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 54; Zadeh 1965, 340). Sets 
are connected using either a multiplication – a logical AND – or an addition – a 
logical OR. The multiplication of two or more sets shows the intersection of at 
                                                             
11  The majority of QCA studies select the conditions for analysis both based on theoretical assump-
tions and empirical evidence. Generally QCA is an inductive research approach. Nonetheless, it is 
also possible to evaluate theories with QCA (see Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 295-305). 
12  By using fuzzy sets, “a continuum of grades of membership’ is applied to a set which resem-
bles the interval scale” (Zadeh 1965, 339). 
13 The calibration is done by using either the direct or the indirect method: The direct method 
automatically transforms the raw data into fuzzy sets according to the three anchors. The pro-
portion of data mostly remains the same. The indirect method uses additional anchors to cap-
ture qualitative differences within the data (Ragin 2008a, 186-92; Verkuilen 2005, 486). 
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least two conditions, e.g. to illustrate their interdependence. The membership in 
the result set of the multiplication is determined by the lowest membership score 
of the case in one of the sets (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 328). An addition 
describes the union of two or more sets and the membership of a case is assigned 
by the highest membership score of the case in one of the sets (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 329). The underlying assumption is that the conditions are in a 
compensatory relation – e.g. the sets refer to functionally equivalent conditions 
(Traeger 1994, 34; Zadeh 1965, 341).  
Table 1:  Notations of the Basic Operations in Set Theory 
Operation Negation Multiplication/logical AND Addition/logical OR 
Notation ~ * + 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 54) and Zadeh (1965, 340f). 
 
The set-theoretical operations make it possible to capture different conjunctions 
of the cases’ set memberships. They serve as the basis for the truth table, which 
presents all logically possible combinations of the chosen conditions as well as 
all information about the cases (Ragin 1987, 87; Schneider and Wagemann 
2012, 91). Therein each set is displayed in a column and each row represents 
“one of the logically possible AND combinations between the conditions” 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 92). Thus the size of the truth table depends 
on the number of conditions.14  
The calibration of the set memberships is the prerequisite for constructing the 
truth table. The comparative cross-case analysis is the second phase of the analyt-
ical process (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013, 3).15 As an example, table 2 presents 
twelve hypothetical cases and their membership scores in the three conditions (i), 
(ii) and (iii). To keep the example simple, crisp sets are used for calibration.16 
  
                                                             
14  The formula is 2k, with k standing for the number of conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 
2012, 92).  
15  Detailed descriptions of the construction and the analysis of a truth table are presented in 
the fourth chapter of the book by Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 91-115). 
16  The assignment of cases to a truth table is not straight forward for fuzzy sets, because the 
membership scores in the conditions may not perfectly fit the truth table rows (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012, 96f). The combinations of conditions in the rows must be understood as 
‘ideal types’: The empirical cases are then attributed to the ideal types by studying their mem-
bership scores in each condition and in the combination of conditions. Each case has only one 
membership > 0.5 per row. The cases are assigned to the combination to which they fit best. 
This illustrates the importance of the point of maximum indifference and justifies the prohibi-
tion of calibrating a membership score with 0.5 (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 102f).  
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Table 2: Hypothetical Data Matrix of Twelve Cases and their Calibrated Crisp Set 
Membership Scores to Three Conditions (i), (ii), (iii) and to an Outcome  
Number Case (i) (ii) (iii) Outcome 
1 A 1 1 1 1 
2 B 1 1 0 0 
3 C 0 0 0 0 
4 D 0 1 0 1 
5 E 1 0 1 0 
6 F 0 1 1 1 
7 G 1 0 0 0 
8 H 1 1 1 1 
9 I 1 0 0 0 
10 J 1 0 1 0 
11 K 0 0 0 0 
12 L 0 1 0 1 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 95). 
1 = The case has full membership in the set of the condition or the outcome. 
0 = The case has no membership in the set of the condition or the outcome.  
 
This data matrix is transformed into a truth table containing eight logically possi-
ble combinations of the three conditions (see table 3).17 The truth table shows that 
only seven of the eight logically possible combinations do materialize in a (hypo-
thetical) empirical reality. The fourth row shows a ‘logical remainder’ and illus-
trates the ‘limited diversity’ of empirical reality, which is caused by the interrela-
tions of the conditions. Some rows do present more than one empirical case 
(Ragin and Sonnett 2005, 181; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 93). 
Table 3: Hypothetical Truth Table Showing the Eight Logically Possible 
Combinations of the Three Conditions 
 (i) (ii) (iii) Outcome Case 
1 0 0 0 0 C, K 
2 1 0 0 0 G, I 
3 0 1 0 1 D, L 
4 0 0 1 0 –– 
5 1 1 0 0 B 
6 1 0 1 0 E, J 
7 0 1 1 1 F 
8 1 1 1 1 A, H 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 96). 
 
The actual analysis in QCA consists of the formal analysis of the truth table in 
order to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome (Ragin 
                                                             
17  The construction of the truth table as well as the assignment of the cases to its rows is 
normally carried out automatically by the software programs for QCA. Different software 
programs exist – e.g. fs.QCA 2.5 – which have been especially developed for QCA (Ragin and 
Davey 2009). Applications for STATA and R are also available.  
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1987, 87). The analyses of the necessary and the sufficient conditions are con-
ducted separately (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 75f). First, the analysis of 
the necessity of one of the conditions for the outcome is conducted. Then the 
analysis of sufficient conditions is carried out by minimizing the truth table 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 104ff).18 The minimization is done using the 
Quine-McCluskey algorithm, which compares the conjunctions in order to 
identify similar ones. Therein “logically redundant prime implicants” are ex-
cluded because they are identified as non-relevant for explaining the outcome 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 332). As a result, the sufficient solution terms 
of the minimization process sum up the entire truth table in compressed form 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 107). According to the principle of equifinali-
ty, they describe different combinations of conditions that lead to an outcome. 
In order to estimate the quality of the solution terms, two parameters – cov-
erage and consistency – have to be considered. Coverage describes the relation-
ship between the set of a condition (xi) and an outcome set (yi). For necessary 
conditions, the coverage measure is crucial to distinguish between the neces-
sary and trivial conditions. The latter are disproportional to the outcome set and 
are thus not relevant for the outcome because a trivial condition is present in 
(nearly) all the cases, regardless of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 
2012, 332).19 The coverage for sufficient conditions (‘solution coverage’) de-
scribes the proportion of cases with a set-membership > 0,5 in the set of at least 
one solution term. It specifies the relationship between all the cases and the 
explained cases while showing how many cases are covered by a solution term 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 131f).20  
The consistency measure indicates the intersection of the outcome set and 
the set of the conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 324). For necessary 
conditions, the consistency shows the extent to which the outcome is a subset 
of the condition and qualifies the ‘statement of necessity’ for the condition. It 
reveals the proportion of cases for which the statement of necessity is not cor-
rect (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 141).21 For sufficient conditions con-
sistency indicates the extent to which a condition explains the outcome. If a 
condition is a complete subset of an outcome, the consistency is perfect 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 123f). The consistency measure shows “the 
                                                             
18  A brief summary with all the relevant instructions on how to conduct the logical minimiza-
tion is given by Ragin (2008b, 124-44).  
19  To distinguish between necessary and trivial conditions, the formula ‘Relevance of necessity’ 
was introduced: ‘
∑ 	(ଵି௫)
∑ 	(ଵି୫୧୬	(௫,௬)’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 236). It defines the explana-
tory power of a condition: the smaller the relevance, the more trivial the condition.  
20  The formula is: ‘Coverage Sufficient Conditions =
∑୫୧୬	(௫,௬)
∑௬ ’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 131).  
21  The formula is: ‘Consistency Necessary Conditions =
∑୫୧୬	(௫,௬)
∑௬ ’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 141).  
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degree to which the empirical information deviates from a perfect subset rela-
tion” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 129).22 
After minimizing the truth table and identifying the necessary and the suffi-
cient conditions, the solution terms must be verified with respect to the con-
junctural and sequential causalities of the conditions. This is part of the ‘post 
QCA’ phase which consists of reconstructing the solution terms by referring to 
typical cases for each solution term as well as deviant cases, which are not 
covered by one of the solution terms (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013, 3).23 Be-
cause of its case orientation, QCA is closely connected to other methodical 
approaches, like case studies or process-tracing.  
The solution terms serve as a basis for conducting case studies by providing 
information about the relevant necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the 
success of an innovation. Based on this, the case studies make it possible to 
check the plausibility of the solution terms and to identify the temporal as well 
as the causal mechanisms within the phases of innovation processes (Abbott 
1995, 95; Beach and Pedersen 2013, 158). Furthermore, the case studies offer 
the possibility for in-depth analysis of the emergence of innovations as well as 
their labelling as novel. The reconstruction of the solution terms through pro-
cess-tracing adds a ‘within-case’ perspective to the comparative approach and 
allows one to inquire into the conjunctural and sequential mechanisms explain-
ing the outcome (Baur 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013, 158; Schneider and 
Rohlfing 2013, 28). By doing so, the empirical findings of the comparative 
analysis may offer insights for modifying the theoretical assumptions (Ragin 
2000, 144; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013, 30f). 
The affinity between QCA and reconstructive approaches makes it possible to 
bridge the gap between case study research on the emergence or invention of 
innovations and comparative research on the conditions for the success of innova-
tions. Both perspectives are combined to adequately capture innovation processes. 
The case reconstructions in combination with the solution terms serve as a 
basis for developing types of mechanisms (Kluge 2000). Empirically based 
types are a first step to identify general mechanisms for innovations in different 
institutional areas. The types of mechanisms serve as middle-range explana-
                                                             
22  The formula is: ‘Consistency Sufficient Conditions =
∑୫୧୬	(௫,௬)
∑௫ ’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 126).  
23 Typical cases can be identified by studying their membership scores both in the outcome set 
and in the set of the conjunction. High membership scores in both sets indicate their fit to 
the solution term (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013, 5). Deviant cases are identified by applying an 
XY plot of the solution term sets and the outcome set. Deviancy may occur with respect to 
consistency or coverage. Deviant cases for consistency do not have a membership score in one 
of the sets of the solution terms, but do have a membership score > 0.5 in the outcome set. 
Deviant cases for coverage do have a membership > 0.5 in one set of the solution terms, but 
lack a membership score > 0.5 in the outcome. Such cases can be explained by looking at spe-
cial features which may cause their deviancy (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013, 28). 
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tions for a particular innovation and may lead to more general and sophisticated 
theories of innovations (cp. Merton 1967, 43; Ragin 1987, 118). 
3.  Equal Pay for Women and Men: Analysing the 
Conditions for a Legal Innovation with QCA 
This chapter presents a brief description of an analysis of a legal innovation to 
illustrate the procedure as well as the possibilities of QCA as a method for 
innovation research. The subject of the analysis is the institutionalisation of 
equal pay regulations for women and men in OECD countries.24 The aim is to 
inquire into the conditions for the institutionalisation of equal pay regulations 
as legal innovations. 
First, the equal pay regulations for women and men need to be defined as in-
novations. As outlined before, three aspects characterize an innovation: It is (1) 
an intended combination of already existing components. Equal pay regulations 
consist of two elements which are intentionally combined in order to guarantee 
equal pay for women and men (cp. Schumpeter 1952, 100): The first element is 
the ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ mode for wage determination. It was first 
introduced by the International Labour Organization (1951) in the Equal Remu-
neration Convention No. 100 and draws a distinction between the physical abili-
ties and preferences of women and men (England 1992, 190f).25 This ‘compara-
ble worth’ mode allows one to identify differences in occupations that are 
predominantly performed by either women or men (England 1992).26 The second 
element consists of a specialized body to evaluate the compliance with the equal 
pay regulation. The key features of the specialized body are its independence 
from the government as a prerequisite and its authority, which is defined by its 
ability to carry out investigations and take “legal action against companies” 
(OECD 2008; cp. Schöpp-Schilling 1988, 229; Winter 1998, 330).27 
                                                             
24  A similar and much more detailed analysis is presented in Laux (2014a, 147-66). 
25  The convention states, ‘the term equal remuneration for men and women workers for work 
of equal value refers to rates of remuneration established without discrimination based on 
sex’ (International Labour Organization 1951). Subsequently, a classification system has to 
be introduced to define ‘work of equal value.’ 
26  The consideration of horizontal segregations in the labour market ensures that different occupa-
tions do not automatically lead to wage inequalities (Baer 2004, 74; England 1992, 304f). 
27  One example for such a specialized body is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), which has been established by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the USA in the 
1960s (Graham 1992, 52; Pedriana 2006, 1736). Originally, the EEOC was introduced to fight 
racial discrimination, but was expanded to include gender discrimination. The EEOC gained 
more powers during the 1960s and 1970s – e.g. the authority of jurisdiction (Graham 1992, 
52, 60). The EEOC served as a role model for other countries. 
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The combination of both elements defines a strong equal pay regulation and is 
designed to enforce equal pay for women and men according to their qualifica-
tions and their occupation with no regard for their gender. It promises (2) a novel 
and better way to ensure equal pay for women and men and marks a fundamental 
change to already existing modes for the solving of this problem (cp. Kern and 
Nam 2009, 639; Polsby 1984, 8; Rogers 1995, 11). Wage determination is not 
left to the actors in the economic system, e.g. through negotiations between em-
ployees and employers. Instead, the specialized body has the authority to super-
vise the wage determination, based on the principle ‘equal pay for work of equal 
value.’ It breaks ‘with the preceding governmental responses’ to the problem and 
introduces a novel procedure to legally regulate wage determination for employ-
ees (Polsby 1984, 8). Thus, the equal pay regulation for women and men is an 
innovation in the legal field (Castro 2012; Duffy 2007). It is defined as an ‘ad-
vance,’ which is “better in accomplishing the purposes of the law” (Duffy 2007, 
3) and is embedded in a broader ‘cultural vision’ (Kern and Nam 2009, 638) of 
modern societies, in which attributes like race or gender do not influence the 
opportunities available to a person (Parsons 1972; Schimank 2005, 242). The 
equal pay regulation is a reaction to the discriminatory practices in wage determi-
nation which are perceived as a social problem. Wage inequalities between wom-
en and men exist in all OECD countries – only the size of the gender pay gap 
differs. One possible explanation for the persistence of wage inequalities is the 
absence of effective equal pay regulations (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 
2005, 486). The identification of innovations is only possible ex-post (3). It be-
comes apparent that a strong equal pay regulation is institutionalised in 50% of 
the OECD countries, which shows its success as an accepted way of ensuring 
equal pay for women and men (Laux 2014a). The task is then to analyse the 
relevant conditions for its institutionalisation (cp. John 2012, 82). In case of legal 
innovations, it is trivial to suppose that the legislation is solely responsible for the 
institutionalisation of the equal pay regulation. Instead the relevant conditions of 
the context as well as the actors are analysed in order to explain the success of the 
equal pay regulation in OECD countries. 
The comparative analysis using QCA focuses on the institutional conditions 
for the equal pay regulation for women and men (the ‘grammar’). Thereafter, 
the mechanisms must be identified by referring to typical cases, which offers 
the opportunity to highlight the special features of the innovation processes. 28 
OECD countries are included in the analysis and it is conducted as a cross-
country comparison for the year 2007. The relative similarity of the cases, in 
terms of prosperity and the quality of democracy, allows one “to isolate the 
factors responsible for differences between them” (Lipset 1990, xiii, cited by 
Hague and Harrop 2004, 83).28 
                                                             
28  The selected countries are Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Iceland, Italy, Japan, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Por-
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3.1  Theoretical Assumptions  
The study of the institutionalisation of equal pay regulations is conducted using 
assumptions of institutional analysis and civil society research. The aim is to 
ascertain whether the equal pay regulations are institutionalised because of 
endogenous or exogenous conditions. The theoretical assumptions address 
different conditions for the institutionalisation of equal pay regulations for 
women and men that focus on transnational and nation-state factors.  
The impact of transnational standards on the legal system of nation states is 
stressed in world-polity research (Heger-Boyle and Meyer 1998). The assumption 
is that laws and regulations are predominantly institutionalised because of exoge-
nous normative or mimetic institutional change (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).29 
The reason for institutionalising equal pay regulations lies in the states’ intention to 
gain legitimacy (Berkovitch 1999; Heger-Boyle and Meyer 1998). The equal pay 
regulation for women and men was, as mentioned earlier, first introduced by the 
ILO Convention No. 100 and was then adapted by the European Union (EU) (EEC 
1976). The ILO convention has been ratified by all OECD countries except the 
USA (ILO 2012). Hence, it is not useful to explain the differences between coun-
tries. Instead, the impact of the EU must be analysed by distinguishing between 
EU members and non-members. The EU embodies the world-polity and is per-
ceived as highly influential in promoting the equality of women and men (Hafner-
Burton and Pollack 2002; Klein 2013; Meyer 2005; Wobbe and Biermann 2007). 
Thus the first assumption (I) states that EU membership is a sufficient condition 
for explaining the institutionalisation of the equal pay regulation.  
The world-polity approach also stresses the impact of International Non-
governmental Organizations (INGOs) for the institutionalisation of gender 
equality laws (Berkovitch 1999; Boli and Thomas 1997). INGOs, as exogenous 
actors, supervise the institutionalisation of global standards – like the equal pay 
for women and men – and translate these standards to the local contexts. Addi-
tionally, they may draw public attention to deficits – e.g. a huge gender pay gap 
– in a country and put pressure on governments to effect change in the form of 
equal pay regulations (Boli and Thomas 1997, 180ff). The second assumption 
(II) is that a significant representation of INGOs in a country may be sufficient 
for the institutionalisation of equal pay regulations for women and men.  
Besides the two assumptions about the influence of exogenous conditions, 
four assumptions about endogenous conditions and actors are analysed: The 
institutionalisation of innovations may also be affected by their legitimacy 
within the population (Strang and Soule 1998, 279). As mentioned earlier, 
                                                                                                                                
tugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovakia, Spain, South Korea, Czech Republic, Turkey, Hungary, UK 
and USA. Greece and Luxemburg were excluded from the analysis because of a lack of availa-
ble information.  
29  There is no superior authority that can force states to institutionalise equal pay regulations. This is 
why the coercive isomorphism mechanism is not applied in the analysis (cp. Beckert 2010, 158).  
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equal pay regulations can be subsumed as part of the general tendency towards 
inclusion (Parsons 1972). But cultural differences with respect to gender equal-
ity must be observed in order to identify the fit of such equal pay regulations to 
the cultural background (Heger-Boyle et al. 2002; Kern 2010). Cross-cultural 
differences in attitudes towards the equality of women and men were discov-
ered by Inglehart and Norris (2003, 2004). So the third assumption (III) states 
that attitudes supporting gender equality are sufficient for the institutionalisa-
tion of equal pay regulations in a country.  
The following assumptions refer to civil society theory, which stresses the im-
portance of processes within the political system and the civil society for legisla-
tion (Alexander 2006). Three different ‘entrepreneurs’ for legal innovation are 
analysed (Schumpeter 1952, 116): The first are women’s movements, which are 
crucial for demanding full inclusion and legal equality for women (Alexander 
2006, 219). Especially the second wave of women’s movements began question-
ing wage inequalities and protesting against discrimination because of gender. 
The women’s movements were and are important for the institutionalisation of 
equal pay regulations because they pressured legislation to establish legal innova-
tions (Eder 2000, 211; Laux 2015). Their strength is defined by evaluating their 
visibility and their activities in public (Eder 2000, 85; Kern 2008, 15). The suffi-
ciency of a strong women’s movement for the institutionalisation of the equal pay 
regulation for women and men is the fourth assumption (IV). 
Other relevant actors for changing labour regulations are unions. Historically, 
they have been engaged in bringing about improvements for employees 
(Ebbinghaus and Visser 1998, 11f). But their commitment to strengthening gen-
der equality is ambiguous because they have been dominated by male employees 
and, therefore, represented male interests. Their ambiguity as actors for gender 
equality has been demonstrated in many studies (Becker 1971, 62; Blascke 2008; 
Kreckel 2004, 276). The fifth assumption (V) states that strong unions are suffi-
cient for the institutionalisation of equal pay laws for women and men.30  
Other relevant actors for the institutionalisation of equal pay regulations 
may be left-wing parties and female representatives in parliament. Their im-
portance arises out of the central role of the legislation for enacting rules and 
regulations. Thus, the composition of the legislative bodies is to be analysed. 
Both groups foster laws for equality between women and men in an equivalent 
way (Htun and Weldon 2010, 208; Laux 2015; Norris 1998, 185). The sixth 
assumption (VI) claims that a strong representation of left-wing parties or 
female representatives is sufficient for the institutionalisation of equal pay 
regulations for women and men. 
                                                             
30  The assumption is the base for examining the role of unions for the institutionalisation of 
equal pay regulations. It does not imply that unions generally support the equality of women 
and men.  
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The outlined assumptions must be understood as expectations and not as hy-
potheses that are to be falsified. Instead, the aim of the analysis is to point out 
interrelations between the conditions in order to illustrate the equifinality as 
well as the conjunctural causation for explaining the outcome. This leads to 
new insights about the relevant actors and conditions in the context of equal 
pay regulations for women and men (cp. Ragin 1987, 170).  
3.2  Analysis 
3.2.1  Operationalization and Calibration 
The first step of the analysis is the operationalization and the calibration of the 
outcome and the conditions. The two elements of the equal pay regulations are 
operationalized separately at first and then combined via the logical AND 
connection. Research on the equal pay regulation for women and men in 
OECD countries is based on the analysis of the legislative texts and surveys by 
the OECD (2008) and the EU (Prechal and Burri 2009).31 
Table 4: Modes for Defining Equal Pay for Women and Men 
Mode Definition Membership 
(i) Equal pay 
(unspecified) 
This mode defines equal pay for all employees without 
mentioning their gender. It does not establish a standard 
for identifying wage inequalities and wage discrimination 
between women and men. 
0 
(ii) Equal pay for 
equal work 
This mode mentions both women and men as employees, 
but does not pay attention to their differences, e.g. in their 
occupation or their physical abilities. Women receive the 
same wage as men if they uphold a certain standard (Baer 
2004, 72). Ignorance of the differences may serve as a 
legitimation of wage inequalities between women and 
men (Kreckel 2004, 237; Lautmann 1990, 43). 
0.3 
(iii) Equal pay for 
work of equal 
value  
This mode mentions both women and men as employees. It 
is then necessary to evaluate ‘work of equal value’ in order 
to pay attention to the differences between women and 
men (England 1992, 190f). It allows for the identification 
of differences between occupations that are predominant-
ly performed by women or men. Thus, different occupa-
tions do not necessarily lead to wage inequalities (England 
1992, 304f). 
1 
Maximum  1 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
                                                             
31  The surveys from the OECD (2008) and the EU (Prechal and Burri 2009) cover 25 of 28 OECD 
countries. The information for three countries, New Zealand, Switzerland and Turkey, was 
obtained separately. 
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There are three modes of defining pay equality (see table 4): (i) A general 
regulation for equal pay for all employees is unspecified and neglects gender as 
a relevant category for wage determination. Hence, it is classified as the weakest 
mode to ensure equal pay for women and men (membership = 0). (ii) The ‘equal 
pay for equal work’ regulation mentions gender as a category, but does not pay 
attention to differences between women and men. Equal pay is guaranteed only if 
women hold up to a certain (male) standard (Baer 2004, 72). Therefore, it is 
classified as a weak mode to ensure equal pay for women and men (membership 
= 0.3). (iii) The third mode is the ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ mode where 
regulation allows for the identification of the differences between women and 
men without legitimating pay inequalities. It is classified as the strongest mode 
to ensure equal pay for women and men (membership = 1). 
The specialized bodies are differentiated with respect to their independence 
from governments as well as their authority in conducting investigations and 
taking legal action against companies. Four types of specialized bodies are 
identified in the OECD countries (see table 5) (OECD 2008; Prechal and Burri 
2009). The classification is based on the degree of independence and the au-
thority of the specialized bodies to conduct investigations and deliver judg-
ments (Schöpp-Schilling 1988, 229; Winter 1998, 330).  
Table 5: Types of Specialized Bodies for Supervising Equal Pay Law 
Types of Specialized Bodies Definition Membership 
(i) No independence There exists no independent specialized body for supervising compliance with the equal pay law. 0 
(ii) Independence and 
low authority  
An independent specialized body exists to supervise 
compliance with the equal pay law. The body only 
starts acting on receiving complaints from employees.
0.2 
(iii) Independence and 
medium authority  
An independent specialized body exists to supervise 
compliance with the equal pay law. This body has 
the authority to conduct regular investigations 
concerning wage determination in companies. 
0.7 
(iv) Independence and 
great authority  
An independent specialized body exists to supervise 
compliance with the equal pay law. The body has 
the authority to conduct investigations concerning 
wage determination and to deliver binding judg-
ments in case of violations of the law. 
1 
Maximum  1 
Source: Author’s elaboration.  
 
The calibration of the outcome (Equal pay regulation) is done using the logical 
AND operation to connect the membership scores for each case in the two sets. 
Therewith, cases with high values in both sets are separated from those with a 
high value in only one set. Only countries with both an ‘equal pay for work of 
equal value’ mode and an independent specialized body for evaluating compli-
ance are classified as having strong equal pay regulations. The calibrated fuzzy 
sets are presented in table 7. 
HSR 40 (2015) 3  │  95 
The first assumption (I) refers to the membership of countries in the EU. 
The operationalization of the membership in the set (EU) is determined by the 
membership of the cases in the EU. Non-members are not parts of the set. Full 
membership is assigned to countries that have been EU members since 1974. 
The second assumption (II) examines the influence of INGOs on equal pay 
regulations. Full membership in the set (INGO) of countries with a strong 
representation of INGOs is given if at least one out of 1,000 citizens is a mem-
ber in such an organization.32 Non-membership is assigned to countries with 
less than one member per 100,000 citizens. The point of maximum indifference 
is stated for one member per 10,000 citizens in a country.  
The impact of attitudes (Attitudes) towards gender equality is mentioned in 
the third assumption and is operationalized via information provided by the 
World Values Survey (2009) (Variable c001: “If jobs are scarce: Men should 
have more right to a job than women”). A majoritarian refusal of this statement 
within the population shows a general consent to equal treatment for women 
and men in the economic system.33 The cases with mean scores > 2.9 are full 
members in the set of countries with strong attitudes towards gender equality. 
A mean score of 2.5 marks the point of maximum indifference.  
The operationalization of the strength of women’s movements (Women’s 
movement) refers to a study by Chafetz and Dworkin (1986).34 The strength of 
the movements is measured according to their size and visibility. Mid-sized 
movements are calibrated above the point of indifference, whereas small 
movements are assigned a membership score < 0.5.  
The strength of unions (Unions) mentioned in the fifth assumption is opera-
tionalized based on their number of members (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000, 
59).35 Full membership of cases in the set of countries with strong unions is 
assigned if more than 70% of the employees in a country are union members. 
The maximum point of indifference is at 30%.  
The sixth assumption examines the representation of left-wing parties and 
women in parliament (Parliament).36 Both sets are connected via an addition by 
                                                             
32  The INGO memberships are mean scores of the data for the years 1966, 1977, 1986, 1997 
and 2000. The operationalization is based on data from the Union of International Associa-
tion (2008; cp. Anheier and Stares 2002). 
33  ‘Consent’ is coded with ‘1,’ ‘Neither’ receives ‘2’ and refusal is coded with ‘3.’ Based on this 
coding, the mean scores for each country were calculated. 
34  Chafetz and Dworkin (1986) analyse Germany, Finland, France, UK, Italy, Japan, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and USA. Women’s movements in the other OECD 
countries were analysed by the author using the same methodology based on at least two 
case studies (Laux 2014a). 
35  The data were taken from the OECD (2013) for the year 2006. For Iceland, the most current 
available data is for the year 2002.  
36  The data was provided by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2012) and for South Korea by 
Croissant (2001). The mean scores for each country were calculated for all available data in 
the period from 1970 to 2006.  
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presuming that both groups fulfil an equivalent function. Full membership in 
the set of cases with a strong representation is assigned if 60% of the seats in 
parliament are held by left-wing parties or 50% of women hold a seat. The 
point of indifference is defined at 45% of left-wing parties or 20% of women in 
parliament, both of which indicate that the groups’ support of gender equality 
is sufficiently represented in parliament. All the anchors for the calibrations are 
summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6: Anchors for Calibration of the Conditions 
 Full  Membership 
Point of  
Indifference 
Full Non-
Membership 
Calibration 
Method 
(I) EU EU member since 1974 
EU member in 
2006 Not an EU member Indirect 
(II) INGO > 1 INGO member per 1,000 citizens 
0.1 INGO member 
per 1,000 citizens 
< 0.01 INGO 
member per 1,000 
citizens 
Indirect 
(III) Attitudes 
> 2.9 (strong 
agreement with 
gender equality in 
the economy) 
2.5 
< 1.8 (weak 
agreement with 
gender equality in 
the economy) 
Indirect 
(IV) Women’s 
Movement Strong 
Below medium 
strength None Indirect 
(V) Unions 
> 70% of all 
employees as 
members 
30% of all em-
ployees as mem-
bers 
< 10% of all 
employees as 
members 
Indirect 
(VI) Parliament 
> 60% of left-
wing parties or 
> 50% of female 
representatives 
45% of left-wing 
parties or 
20% of female 
representatives 
< 10% of left-
wing parties or 
< 5% of female 
representatives 
Indirect 
Source: Author’s elaboration.  
 
Table 7 presents all the calibrated fuzzy sets for the outcome and the condi-
tions. They form the basis for the set-up of the truth table and its minimization.  
Table 7: Calibrated Fuzzy Sets of the Outcome and the Conditions 
Cases 
Equal Pay 
Regulation 
(fs) 
EU  
(fs) 
INGO 
(fs) 
Attitudes 
(fs) 
Women’s 
Movement 
(fs) 
Unions 
(fs) 
Parliament 
(fs) 
Australia   0.2 0   0.3   0.6   0.6   0.2   0.8 
Austria   0.2   0.8   0.7   0.3   0.2   0.6   0.8 
Belgium   0.2 1   0.7   0.4   0.6   0.8   0.3 
Canada 1 0   0.3   0.7   0.6   0.6   0.3 
Czech Rep. 0   0.7   0.7   0.4 0   0.2 1 
Denmark 1 1   0.7   0.9   0.6   0.9   0.8 
Finland   0.7   0.8   0.7   0.8   0.6 1   0.8 
France 1 1   0.2   0.4   0.6 0   0.3 
Germany   0.2 1   0.2   0.3   0.6   0.3   0.8 
Hungary   0.2   0.7   0.7   0.4 0   0.2 1 
Iceland 1 0 1 1 1 1   0.8 
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Table 7 continued... 
Cases 
Equal Pay 
Regulation 
(fs) 
EU  
(fs) 
INGO 
(fs) 
Attitudes 
(fs) 
Women’s 
Movement 
(fs) 
Unions 
(fs) 
Parliament 
(fs) 
Ireland 1 1   0.7   0.6   0.2   0.6   0.2 
Italy   0.2 1   0.2   0.3 1   0.6   0.3 
Japan   0.3 0   0.2   0.1   0.2   0.2   0.3 
Mexico 1 0   0.2   0.3   0.2   0.1   0.3 
Netherlands   0.7 1   0.7   0.8 1   0.1   0.8 
New Zealand   0.2 0   0.7   0.7   0.2   0.3   0.8 
Norway 1 0   0.7   0.7   0.6   0.3   0.9 
Poland 1   0.7   0.2   0.2 0   0.8   0.8 
Portugal 1   0.9   0.7   0.3   0.2   0.2   0.3 
Slovakia 0   0.7   0.7   0.3 0   0.3   0.8 
South Korea 0 0   0.2   0.1 0   0.3   0.2 
Spain 0   0.9   0.3   0.4   0.2   0.2   0.3 
Sweden 1   0.8   0.7 1   0.2 1   0.9 
Switzerland   0.2 0   0.7   0.3   0.2   0.2   0.3 
Turkey 0 0   0.2 0   0.2 0   0.3 
UK 1 1   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.4   0.8 
USA 1 0 0   0.8 1   0.1   0.1 
Source: Author’s elaboration.  
3.2.2  Solution Terms 
The analysis of necessary conditions is conducted before the minimization of 
the truth table. It reveals that neither of the conditions is necessary or trivial.37 
Analysis of the sufficient conditions is conducted by using the two-step ap-
proach, which makes it possible to distinguish between remote and proximate 
conditions in order to solve “the well-known problem of ‘too many variables 
and too few cases”’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 756).38 
In the first step, three remote conditions (EU, Attitudes, INGO) are analysed.39 
The solution presents one ‘outcome-enabling condition’ (Schneider and Wagemann 
2006, 761): Attitudes. This condition is included in the second step along with the 
three proximate conditions (Women’s movements, Unions, Parliament).40 The 
                                                             
37  The analysis is conducted by using the fs.QCA 2.5 program (Ragin and Davey 2009).  
38  Remote conditions are structural factors that are ‘relatively stable over time,’ whereas 
proximate conditions mark actors. The two-step approach allows one to study the interrela-
tion of structure and agency (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 760).  
39  Table A in the appendix shows the truth table. 7 out of 8 logical possible conjunctions can 
be found empirically. The thresholds for the selection of the conjunctions were 0.7 for the 
consistency score and 0.6 for the PRI score and the analysis is conducted by using the most 
parsimonious solution. 
40  Table B in the appendix shows the truth table. In this second step, 13 out of 16 logical 
possible conjunctions also exist empirically. To select the conjunctions, a consistency thresh-
old of 0.75 and a PRI threshold of 0.61 were applied. The solution terms present the inter-
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analysis reveals that two combinations of conditions are sufficient for explaining 
a strong equal pay regulation in a country (see table 8). Both solution terms are 
equifinal and have a similar explanatory power for the outcome.  
Table 8: Sufficient Solution Terms for Strong Equal Pay Regulation  
Solution Terms (1) Women’s movement * ~Unions 
(2) 
Unions* Attitudes 
Countries UK, Netherlands, USA, Australia, France, Germany, Norway 
Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, 
Finland, Canada, Ireland 
Raw Coverage 0.41 0.53 
Unique Coverage 0.18 0.30 
Consistency 0.77 0.84 
Solution Coverage 0.71 0.71 
Solution Consistency 0.80 0.80 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
The first solution term (1) reveals that a strong women’s movement in combina-
tion with weak unions is sufficient for a strong equal pay regulation for women 
and men in a country. The second solution term (2) points out that strong unions in 
combination with strong attitudes towards gender equality are sufficient to ex-
plain the outcome. Both solutions are outlined in the following chapter (see 3.3).  
The two solution terms cover 71% of the countries with a membership in the 
outcome set > 0.5 (solution coverage). They explain 80% of the outcome (solu-
tion consistency). Two cases, Germany and Australia, are not described by 
either one of the solution terms and are thus deviant cases for consistency. On 
the other hand, Poland, Mexico and Portugal have a membership score > 0.5 in 
one of the sets of the solution terms, but lack a membership in the outcome set 
> 0.5. Thus, they are deviant cases for coverage and are not explained by one of 
the solution terms.  
3.3  Results 
The reconstruction of the solution terms is based on typical cases. The aim is to 
capture the conjunctural and sequential causalities of the conditions in order to 
identify the mechanisms for a strong equal pay regulation. Both mechanisms 
are equifinal for explaining equal pay regulations as legal innovations. Two 
typical cases were chosen: UK is the typical case for reconstructing the first 
solution (Women’s movement * ~Unions), whereas Denmark offers further 
insights into the second solution (Unions * Attitudes). 
1) The interplay of a strong women’s movement with weak unions as an ex-
planation for a strong equal pay regulation (The case of the UK) 
                                                                                                                                
mediate solutions. The directional expectation was that the attitudes towards gender 
equality (Attitudes) foster the institutionalisation of equal pay regulations. 
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The strong equal pay regulation in the UK dates back to the Equal Pay Act 
(1970) and the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) (Lovenduski and Randall 1993, 
188).41 The Equal Pay Act introduced the ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ 
mode and the Sex Discrimination Act established an Equal Opportunity Com-
mission (EOC) as an independent specialized body with great authority in the 
UK (OECD 2008). 
The women’s movement in the UK was the major actor for the institutional-
isation of the strong equal pay regulation (Cohen 2012, 63; Gelb 1986, 108). 
The significance of weak unions becomes clear on examining their relationship 
with the women’s movement. The influence of the women’s movement on the 
unions was marginal although some of their activists also were union members 
(Gelb 1986, 107). The union’s politics focused on their male members, which 
made the women’s movement the key representative for the interests of work-
ing women (Gelb 1986, 103ff).  
The origin of the strong equal pay regulation lies in the Ford sewing machin-
ists’ strike of 1968 (Cohen 2012, 51). It emerged because of a new job evalua-
tion, negotiated between unions and employers, which discriminated against 
female workers. The strike gained much attention and spread to other factories 
undergoing similar job evaluations. It was supported by the women’s movement 
and, subsequently, equal pay for women became one of their key issues (Cohen 
2012, 52f, 63). The protest of the female workers and the women’s movement 
addressed the political class, which led to the enactment of the Equal Pay Act 
(1970) (Cohen 2012, 63). Major sections of the Labour Party supported the Equal 
Pay Act but had not been able to enact an equal pay regulation because of their 
close connection to the unions (Lorwin and Boston 1984, 144).  
The enactment of the Equal Pay Act did not end the protest of the women’s 
movement. In 1970, the National Joint Action Campaign Committee for Wom-
en and Equal Rights (NJACCWER) was founded to intensify the pressure on 
politics to regulate wage determination more thoroughly (Lovenduski and 
Randall 1993, 180f). Public pressure and the lobbying of the NJACCWER 
strongly influenced the enactment of the Sex Discrimination Act, which estab-
lished the Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) as an independent specialized 
body with great authority. The EOC consists of representatives from employ-
ers, unions and women’s rights organizations (Lovenduski and Randall 1993, 
181ff).42 The EOC limited the autonomy of collective bargaining in order to 
prevent inequalities due to gender. 
                                                             
41  Subsequently the Equal Pay (Amendment) Act (1984) completed the equal pay regulation. It 
defines the standards for ensuring the comparability of the ‘equal pay for work of equal 
value‘. The EOC together with the unions were responsible for the enactment of the Equal 
Pay (Amendment) Act (Conley 2014, 313). 
42  In 2007, the EOC changed its name to the Equality and Human Rights Commission. 
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The reconstruction points out that the women’s movement was crucial 
for the institutionalisation of the strong equal pay regulation, which con-
firms the assumption about social movements as ‘entrepreneurs’ for inno-
vations (Schumpeter 1952, 116; cp. Eder 2000, 184; Kern 2008, 15).43 The 
connectedness of the women’s movement with other civil society organizations 
placed the issue of unequal pay on the agenda of politics and legislation. 
Therewith, civil society influenced politics and economy by enacting a legal 
innovation (Alexander 2006, 205ff). The women’s movement was in charge 
both of the labelling and the institutionalisation of the strong equal pay regula-
tion as a legal innovation. Its strength can also be attributed to the inactivity 
and the weakness of the unions to represent the interest of female workers. This 
supported the mobilization of the women’s movement and indirectly fostered 
their impact on the public and on politics (Siim 2000, 95). The reconstruction 
of the solution term illustrates this sequential causality of the two conditions. 
2) The interplay of strong unions and attitudes supporting gender equality as an 
explanation for a strong equal pay regulation (The case of Denmark) 
The movement for a strong equal pay regulation in Denmark dates back to the 
collective bargaining between unions and employers at the beginning of the 
1970s. The results of the bargaining built the foundation for the legal innovation 
to ensure equal pay for women and men (Foged et al. 1984, 50). It was enacted 
through the Equal Pay Act (1976) and the Gender Equality Board (OECD 2008).  
The unions were the major actors for ensuring the equality of women and men 
in Denmark and they were closely connected to the Labour Party and the wom-
en’s movement (Foged et al. 1984, 46). The federation of labour unions in Den-
mark was strongly influenced by the female workers union (KvindeligtArbejder-
forbundiDanmark (KAD)), which led to the addressing of gender equality and 
equal pay in collective bargaining (Foged et al. 1984, 52; Rosholm and Smith 
1996, 258). The unions’ commitment to equal pay can be attributed to the strong 
women’s workers’ union as well as the high number of female union members 
and was ensured by the attitudes within the population supporting gender equali-
ty. In Denmark, there was hardly any controversy about the principle and necessi-
ty of equal pay for women and men and all parties supported the equal pay regu-
lation (Skjeie and Siim 2000, 346; Dahlerup 1986, 228f). 
The interplay of unions as actors and attitudes supporting gender equality 
led to the enactment of a strong equal pay regulation (Siim 2000, 132f). To-
gether they put pressure on politics, especially on the Labour Party, to enact the 
legal innovation. The strong equal pay regulation for women and men is also 
compatible with the Danish welfare policy, which has been characterized by 
extensive labour laws (Dahlerup 1986, 241). 
                                                             
43  ‘Entrepreneurs’ are defined by their capability to implement innovations (Schumpeter 1952, 116).  
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The strong equal pay regulation for Denmark was first created through col-
lective bargaining at the beginning of the 1970s. It was a consequence of the 
growing awareness among unions of the problem of pay inequalities between 
women and men. Its labelling as a solution to the problem of unequal pay was 
then picked up by the parliament. The reconstruction illustrates the conjunctural 
causation of the two conditions of the solution term. That points to the contingent 
engagement of unions towards gender equality, which depends on the social 
context and their membership structure (Becker 1971, 62; Kreckel 2004, 276). As 
a result, unions were not forerunners for equal pay regulations, but responded to 
unequal pay for women as a social problem. This marks the distinction between 
unions and the women’s movement as representatives of women’s interests. 
4.  Conclusion and Outlook 
The conclusion first captures the results of the presented analysis in order to 
illustrate QCA’s strengths for analysing the institutional conditions for innova-
tions. Afterwards the general features of QCA are summarized to stress its 
appropriateness as a method for innovation research and as an autonomous 
approach next to qualitative and quantitative methods. 
The analysis showed that two combinations of conditions are sufficient to 
explain strong equal pay regulations in OECD countries. The results highlight 
two of the crucial features of QCA: its capability to identify equifinal explana-
tions for an outcome and to capture the interrelation of the conditions. A strong 
equal pay regulation is either caused by the impact of women’s movements, who 
gain their strength in contrast to weak and passive unions in matters of gender 
equality, or goes back to unions, who act on behalf of an overall societal consen-
sus about the necessity of gender equality. The results illustrate the importance of 
capturing the interdependence of structure and action for identifying mechanisms. 
They also show the ambiguity of unions as actors for or against gender equality 
which can be at least partly explained by referring to their social context. The 
results of the comparative analysis of the institutional conditions of equal pay 
regulations are completed with the reconstructions of two typical cases that illus-
trate the plausibility of the results as well as the sequential and conjunctural 
interrelations of the conditions.  
As a method for innovation research, QCA offers a unique perspective on 
the institutionalisation of innovations: Based on set-theoretic assumptions and 
the principles equifinality, conjunctural causation and asymmetry, QCA makes it 
possible to capture the context-sensitivity and contingency of innovation process-
es. The identification of an innovation ex-post is the starting point for the com-
parative analysis. Subsequently, the results of the comparative analysis provide 
the frameworks for conducting in-depth analyses of typical cases for each solu-
tion term. The reconstruction of the typical cases offers the possibility to connect 
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the ‘grammar’ of innovation processes with the ‘pragmatics’ and ‘semantics’ 
(Hutter et al. 2015). Therewith, QCA bridges the methodological divide between 
qualitative and quantitative methods in innovation research in order to gain a 
broader and more diversity-oriented perspective on the institutionalisation of 
innovations. Furthermore, QCA helps discover deviant cases, which are either 
forerunners or deniers of innovations and are thus probably interesting cases for 
further inquiries (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013). 
As mentioned before, the aim of this article was not to present QCA as a better 
or more sophisticated method for innovation research. Instead its approach may 
offer interesting insights into innovation processes. QCA avoids treating cases as 
idiosyncrasies or generating oversimplified explanations of social phenomena. 
Compared to the qualitative and quantitative methods, QCA’s benefit consists in 
its diversity orientation, which moves “between complexity and generality” 
(Ragin 2000, 21). Its basic principles ensure the suitability for the contingent and 
manifold social reality, which challenges social research.  
28 years after its invention, QCA has been implemented in political science, 
sociology and organization studies. It offers interesting insights for innovation 
research, which may enrich the study of innovations and foster the develop-
ment of theories of innovation.  
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Appendix  
Table A: Truth Table of the First Step of the QCA Analysis (Remote Conditions) 
Combination EU Attitudes INGO Number Equal Pay Regulation Consistency PRI 
1 1 0 1 6 0 0,52 0,34 
2 1 0 0 6 0 0,61 0,48 
3 1 1 1 5 1 0,77 0,69 
4 0 0 0 4 0 0,50 0,35 
5 0 1 1 3 1 0,71 0,62 
6 0 1 0 3 1 0,72 0,63 
7 0 0 1 1 0 0,57 0,34 
8 1 1 0 0 ?   
Source: Author’s elaboration.  
Table B: Truth Table of the Second Step of the QCA Analysis (Proximate 
Conditions)  
Combina-
tion Attitudes Unions Parliament
Women’s 
Movement Number
Equal Pay 
Regulation Consistency PRI 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0,89 0,83 
2 1 1 1 1 3 1 0,88 0,83 
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 0,84 0,72 
4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0,84 0,73 
5 0 0 0 1 1 1 0,83 0,70 
6 1 0 1 1 3 1 0,81 0,70 
7 1 1 1 0 1 1 0,80 0,70 
8 0 0 1 1 2 1 0,76 0,61 
9 0 1 0 1 2 0 0,72 0,48 
10 0 1 1 0 2 0 0,72 0,58 
11 1 0 1 0 1 0 0,63 0,49 
12 0 0 0 0 7 0 0,59 0,47 
13 0 0 1 0 3 0 0,55 0,39 
14 0 1 0 0 0 0   
15 0 1 1 1 0 0   
16 1 0 0 0 0 0   
Source: Author’s elaboration.  
